
InvThink: Towards AI Safety via Inverse Reasoning

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Abstract

We present INVTHINK, a simple yet powerful approach that gives language models the capability of *inverse thinking*: reasoning through failure modes before generating responses. Unlike existing safety alignment methods that optimize directly for safe response, INVTHINK instructs models to 1) enumerate potential harms, 2) analyze their consequences, and 3) generate safe outputs that proactively avoid these risks. Our paper reveals three key findings: (i) INVTHINK demonstrates significantly improved safety reasoning as model size scales, compared to existing safety methods. (ii) INVTHINK mitigates *safety tax*; by training models to systematically consider failure modes, it preserves general reasoning capabilities on standard benchmarks. (iii) beyond general safety tasks, INVTHINK excels in high-stakes domains including external-facing applications (medicine, finance, law) and agentic risk scenarios (blackmail, murder), achieving up to 17.8% reduction in harmful responses compared to baseline methods like SafetyPrompt. We further equip INVTHINK with supervised fine-tuning, and reinforcement learning across three LLM families. These results suggest that INVTHINK provides a scalable and generalizable path toward safer, more capable language models.¹

1. Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become increasingly capable across domains ranging from math (Huang & Yang, 2025), coding (Zhang et al., 2024a), robotics (Mon-Williams et al., 2025) to healthcare (Kim et al., 2024; Cosentino et al., 2024) and scientific discovery (Agarwal et al., 2022). Yet their deployment remains hindered by persistent safety concerns such as *hallucinations* that mislead users (Kalai et al., 2025), biased or discriminatory content (Sheng et al., 2021; Bender et al., 2021), privacy risks (Carlini et al., 2021), and unsafe recommendations that could cause real-world harm

(Bommasani et al., 2022). These risks not only persist but often become more subtle and harder to detect as models grow in scale (Bereska & Gavves, 2024).

Existing approaches to safety alignment, such as reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) (Christiano et al., 2017; Ouyang et al., 2022), constitutional AI (Bai et al., 2022), and adversarial red-teaming (Perez et al., 2022; Ganguli et al., 2022), have made progress in reducing harmful behavior. Yet they remain fundamentally limited. They rely on forward-only optimization which teaches the models what safe outputs look like, but not how failures might arise. As a result, they struggle with adversarial prompts or universal jailbreak attacks (Zou et al., 2024; Shen et al., 2024), fail to cover long-tail harms, and often impose a *safety tax* where reasoning capability declines as safety improves (Dai et al., 2024; Maskey et al., 2025). Moreover, studies of value alignment show that even aligned models can produce unintended harms in real-world settings (Choi et al., 2025).

Reasoning-based prompting techniques such as Chain-of-Thought (CoT) (Wei et al., 2022) and Tree-of-Thought (ToT) (Yao et al., 2023) improve interpretability and task accuracy but do not inherently guarantee safety. In fact, reasoning traces can themselves be exploited to bypass safeguards, as shown in recent attacks that hijack safety reasoning (Kuo et al., 2025). Reasoning can even degrade inductive performance rather than improving it (Jin et al., 2025), and introspective methods like SafeChain (Jiang et al., 2025) or STAIR (Zhang et al., 2025b) show only modest gains that do not scale consistently with model size. Broader evaluations such as TRIDENT (Hui et al., 2025), FFT (Cui et al., 2023), and R-Judge (Yuan et al., 2024) reveal systematic vulnerabilities. These results suggest that current approaches are not enough; safety reasoning remains brittle, reactive, and insufficiently scalable.

To this end, we propose INVTHINK, an inverse reasoning framework to improve AI safety in LLMs. Instead of optimizing toward safe responses, INVTHINK enforces models to enumerate potential harms, analyze their consequences, and only then generate responses constrained to avoid those harms. By making failures an explicit step in reasoning, our method transforms safety from a reactive safeguard into a proactive capability. Inspired by decision science (Kahneman, 2013; Zhao, 2024) and classical reliability engineering

¹Project Page: <https://invthink.github.io/>


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Figure 1. **Overview.** INVTHINK consists of three stages: (1) Data Augmentation: Original prompts are augmented with inverse reasoning traces generated by a teacher Language Model (LM) that explicitly enumerate potential harms before generating forward reasoning and safe responses. (2) Supervised Fine-tuning: The augmented dataset containing original prompts, inverse reasoning, and forward reasoning is used to train other model on both harm identification and constrained generation. (3) Reinforcement Learning: The model is further refined using GRPO with safety rewards, strengthening its ability to avoid identified harms while maintaining task performance.

such as Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) (Levenson, 2016; Bahr et al., 2025; El Hassani et al., 2025), this inversion enables LLMs to cover adversarial and emergent risks more effectively, while preserving task performance.

Our contributions are as follows:

1. We propose INVTHINK, a framework that embeds inverse thinking into the reasoning process of LLMs, enabling models to proactively anticipate harms before producing outputs.
2. We demonstrate that INVTHINK improves safety performance in proportion to model scale, achieving stronger gains than prior safety alignment methods.
3. We show that INVTHINK preserves general reasoning ability while improving safety, thereby mitigating the safety tax observed in earlier approaches.

2. Related Works

Safety Challenges in LLMs The deployment of LLMs in high-stakes domains reveals diverse failure modes with serious consequences. In healthcare, red-teaming studies expose substantial harmful outputs under adversarial inputs, even in domain-adapted models (Chang et al., 2024). Data poisoning and weight-manipulation attacks can embed targeted harmful behaviors while maintaining benchmark performance (Wan et al., 2023). Professional domains show similar vulnerabilities, with models producing outputs vio-

lating ethical codes in finance, law, and medicine (Hui et al., 2025). Emerging agentic capabilities introduce novel risks. Models with advanced reasoning may exhibit sophisticated harmful behaviors when facing autonomy threats or goal conflicts a “capability curse” where improved reasoning enables more complex harmful strategies (Lynch et al., 2025; Yuan et al., 2024). Systematic benchmarks like SafetyBench (Zhang et al., 2024b), TRIDENT (Hui et al., 2025), FFT (Cui et al., 2023), and R-Judge (Yuan et al., 2024) reveal consistent blind spots in forward-only alignment approaches across multiple safety dimensions.

Safety Alignment Methods Current alignment approaches span from human feedback to automated methods. RLHF remains standard for training helpful, harmless assistants (Christiano et al., 2017; Ouyang et al., 2022), while Constitutional AI reduces human labeling through principle-based generation (Bai et al., 2022). Self-critique methods leverage models’ own evaluations (Tan et al., 2023). Adversarial testing reveals persistent vulnerabilities through red-teaming (Perez et al., 2022; Ganguli et al., 2022) and universal adversarial triggers (Zou et al., 2024). Practical safeguards like filters and refusal heuristics operate reactively, missing subtle harm chains or over-refusing (Aspell et al., 2021; Dai et al., 2024).

Safety Reasoning Methods Reasoning methods such as Chain-of-Thought (CoT), Tree-of-Thought (ToT), and

Table 1. Comparison of Reasoning Methods with Safety-Related Features

	CoT	ToT	RevThink	InvThink (Ours)
Diagram				
Multiple Reasoning Paths	✗	✓	✓	✓
Backward Reasoning	✗	✗	✓	✓
Adversarial Brainstorming	✗	✗	✗	✓
Purpose	Interpretability	Diverse solutions	Forward-backward consistency	Harm pre-enum. & forward pass

Graph-of-Thought (GoT) improve interpretability but introduce new vulnerabilities; adversaries can exploit reasoning traces, and long chains may harm generalization (Wei et al., 2022; Yao et al., 2023; Besta et al., 2024; Kuo et al., 2025; Jin et al., 2025). Safety-specific reasoning approaches like SafeChain and STAIR show limited scaling (Jiang et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2025b). Proactive approaches adapt reliability engineering concepts, with LLMs integrated in FMEA pipelines (Bahr et al., 2025; El Hassani et al., 2025) and safe inverse RL exploring constraint learning (Yang et al., 2022; Li et al., 2022). Recent reasoning safeguards act as external filters rather than embedding harm anticipation directly (Ball et al., 2025). Recent work such as SafetyAnalyst (Li et al., 2025a) and RATIONAL (Zhang et al., 2025a) also incorporates structured safety reasoning, but both primarily function as post-hoc analytic layers that evaluate or rationalize decisions rather than guiding the generative process itself. Our InvThink differs by embedding adversarial brainstorming and consequence simulation within the generation process, transforming the final output through proactive harm mitigation rather than retrospective assessment. As summarized in Table 1, InvThink distinguishes itself from prior reasoning methods by incorporating adversarial brainstorming and safety-focused mitigation directly into its structure, moving beyond the goals of interpretability diversity to a primary focus on proactive harm prevention.

3. InvThink: Inverse Reasoning for AI Safety

We provide a formal description of the problem setup in 3.1, and introduce the learning objectives in model trainings in 3.2 (for an overview see Fig. 1).

3.1. Problem Formulation

Let \mathcal{X} denote the space of input queries and \mathcal{Y} the space of possible responses. For a given query $x \in \mathcal{X}$, our goal is to generate a safe and helpful response $y^* \in \mathcal{Y}$. Standard approaches model this as learning a direct mapping $p(y|x)$.

In contrast, InvThink introduces an intermediate structured reasoning process.

We define a latent reasoning trace z_{inv} , which explicitly models the process of identifying and mitigating potential harms. This trace consists of harm enumeration, consequence analysis, and a mitigation strategy. The generation of the final response y^* is conditioned on both the original query x and this inverse reasoning trace z_{inv} .

The overall generative process is decomposed into two steps:

1. **Inverse Reasoning Step:** Generate the safety-focused reasoning trace given the input query:

$$z_{inv} \sim p_\theta(z|x) \quad (1)$$

2. **Constrained Generation Step:** Generate the final response conditioned on both the query and the reasoning trace:

$$y^* \sim p_\theta(y|x, z_{inv}) \quad (2)$$

where θ represents the parameters of the language model. Our training methodology is designed to teach the model to produce this structured two-step output, effectively internalizing the process of inverse thinking.

3.2. Training Methodology

We implement INVTHINK in three phases: data augmentation, supervised fine-tuning, and reinforcement learning. The INVTHINK prompt templates are provided in Figure 10.

3.2.1. PHASE 1: DATA AUGMENTATION WITH INVERSE REASONING

The core of our method is augmenting the training data with structured inverse reasoning traces. For each training example (x, y) , we use Gemini-2.5 Pro as a teacher model to generate a comprehensive trace that transforms a simple input-output pair into a detailed learning instance, modeling the process of proactive risk mitigation.

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 166 *Table 2.* Safety performance across domains using **Ensemble Evaluation**. Results are averaged across three judges (Gemini-2.5 Pro,
 167 o3-mini, Claude 3.7 Sonnet). Inter-judge agreement is high (Pearson $r=0.819$, Spearman $\rho=0.831$, safety agreement 86.9%), and
 168 InvThink shows the highest cross-judge stability (76.7% exact agreement, mean deviation 0.319). Best results in **bold**, second best
 169 underlined.

Method	Dataset		
	SafetyBench (\uparrow)	TRIDENT (\downarrow)	Insider Threat (\downarrow)
 Gemma-7B-it			
Zero-shot	0.72 ± 0.01	3.15 ± 0.05	0.07 ± 0.00
CoT	0.69 ± 0.01	3.23 ± 0.03	0.05 ± 0.01
ToT	0.62 ± 0.02	3.41 ± 0.04	0.12 ± 0.02
SafetyPrompt	0.67 ± 0.02	2.82 ± 0.03	0.04 ± 0.00
InvThink	0.73 ± 0.02	2.38 ± 0.02	0.03 ± 0.00
 Qwen-2.5-7B			
Zero-shot	0.73 ± 0.01	3.38 ± 0.04	0.04 ± 0.00
CoT	0.76 ± 0.01	3.50 ± 0.05	0.05 ± 0.02
ToT	0.71 ± 0.03	3.35 ± 0.04	0.07 ± 0.02
SafetyPrompt	0.75 ± 0.02	2.64 ± 0.04	0.03 ± 0.00
InvThink	0.76 ± 0.01	2.17 ± 0.02	0.02 ± 0.00
General SFT	0.76 ± 0.01	2.11 ± 0.03	0.05 ± 0.00
General SFT+RL	0.77 ± 0.02	1.87 ± 0.04	0.02 ± 0.00
InvThink SFT	0.79 ± 0.01	1.71 ± 0.02	0.02 ± 0.00
InvThink SFT+RL	0.82 ± 0.02	1.53 ± 0.02	0.00 ± 0.00
 Qwen-3-8B			
Zero-shot	0.76 ± 0.01	3.12 ± 0.04	0.07 ± 0.01
CoT	0.83 ± 0.01	2.91 ± 0.04	0.10 ± 0.02
ToT	0.77 ± 0.02	3.18 ± 0.03	0.11 ± 0.02
SafetyPrompt	0.84 ± 0.01	2.39 ± 0.04	0.06 ± 0.00
InvThink	0.85 ± 0.00	2.02 ± 0.03	0.02 ± 0.00
General SFT	0.82 ± 0.02	1.95 ± 0.03	0.04 ± 0.00
General SFT+RL	0.85 ± 0.01	1.62 ± 0.03	0.02 ± 0.00
InvThink SFT	0.87 ± 0.01	1.58 ± 0.02	0.01 ± 0.00
InvThink SFT+RL	0.89 ± 0.01	1.22 ± 0.02	0.00 ± 0.00
Teacher Model			
 Gemini-2.5 Pro	0.85 ± 0.03	1.70 ± 0.01	0.03 ± 0.00

206 The augmented dataset, $\mathcal{D}_{\text{aug}} = \{(x_i, z_{\text{inv},i}, y_i^*)\}_{i=1}^N$, contains the original query x , the final safe response y^* , and the
 207 inverse reasoning trace z_{inv} . Each trace consists of:
 208

209
 210 1. **Harm Enumeration (\mathcal{H}):** A list of failure modes or
 211 unsafe ways to respond to the query x .
 212
 213 2. **Consequence Analysis (\mathcal{A}):** A detailed explanation of
 214 why each identified harm is problematic.
 215
 216 3. **Mitigation Strategy (\mathcal{M}):** Actionable constraints de-
 217 rived from the analysis to guide safe response generation.
 218
 219

3.2.2. PHASE 2: SUPERVISED FINE-TUNING (SFT)

Using the augmented dataset \mathcal{D}_{aug} , we fine-tune the model using a multi-task objective designed to teach both inverse and forward reasoning:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{SFT}} = \mathbb{E}_{(x, z_{\text{inv}}, y^*) \sim \mathcal{D}_{\text{aug}}} [-\log p_{\theta}(z_{\text{inv}}, y^* | x)], \quad (3)$$

This loss function trains the model to generate the entire safety trace end-to-end, from identifying potential harms to producing the final safe answer. For further details on the training hyperparameters, please refer to Table 3 in Appendix A.

220 3.2.3. PHASE 3: REINFORCEMENT LEARNING (RL)
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 222 Following recent advances in reasoning-focused post-
 223 training (Mu et al., 2024; Guan et al., 2024; Dai et al., 2024),
 224 we employ Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO)
 225 (Shao et al., 2024), which has proven particularly effective
 226 in enhancing mathematical reasoning and complex problem
 227 solving in LLMs. Unlike traditional Proximal Policy Opti-
 228 mization (PPO) (Ouyang et al., 2022), GRPO eliminates the
 229 value function network, thereby avoiding the need to train
 230 it and improving training efficiency. Instead, it generates
 231 multiple responses per prompt and computes relative ad-
 232 vantages based on the group reward distribution. Although
 233 Direct Policy Optimization (DPO) (Rafailov et al., 2023)
 234 also removes the value function, it is restricted to learning
 235 from binary chosen/rejected pairs. In contrast, GRPO trains
 236 on ranked groups of responses, enabling it to capture more
 237 fine-grained preference information. A detailed comparison
 238 between DPO and GRPO is provided in Appendix B.

239 We use the same dataset \mathcal{D}_{aug} to train the model using GRPO.
 240 For each query x , we sample G responses of the current pol-
 241 icy denoted by \hat{y} , where we set $G = 4$ in our experiments:
 242

$$\{\hat{y}_1, \dots, \hat{y}_G\} \sim \pi_{\theta}(\hat{y}|x, z_{\text{inv}}) \quad (4)$$

243 Each response receives a reward for safety:
 244

$$r_i = R_{\text{safety}}(\hat{y}_i), \quad (5)$$

245 where R_{safety} evaluates whether the response successfully
 246 avoids the identified harms. Although any suitable model
 247 can serve as the safety reward model, we use the pre-existing
 248 Moderation API (Markov et al., 2023), which provides a
 249 wide range of harmfulness categories and associated risk
 250 scores. We also compare the two reward models, the Moder-
 251 ation API and WildGuard (Han et al., 2024), in Appendix B.
 252 It is also possible to incorporate task-specific rewards when
 253 necessary, thereby allowing the training process to adapt to
 254 particular objectives beyond safety.
 255

256 The advantage for each response is computed relative to the
 257 group mean:
 258

$$A_i = r_i - \bar{r}, \quad \text{where } \bar{r} = \frac{1}{G} \sum_{j=1}^G r_j \quad (6)$$

259 The GRPO objective is defined as:
 260

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}_{\text{GRPO}}(\theta) = -\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{i=1}^G \frac{\pi_{\theta}(y_i | x)}{\pi_{\text{ref}}(y_i | x)} \text{clip}(A_i, -\epsilon, \epsilon) \right] \\ + \eta D_{\text{KL}}(\pi_{\theta}(\cdot | x) \| \pi_{\text{ref}}(\cdot | x)). \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

261 where π_{ref} is the reference policy (from SFT), the clipping
 262 function constrains policy updates, and the KL divergence
 263

264 term penalizes deviations of the policy from the SFT base-
 265 line. For further details on the training hyperparameters,
 266 please refer to Table 4 in Appendix A.

4. Experiment

4.1. Setup

267 To rigorously evaluate our InvThink framework, we selected
 268 three distinct benchmarks (SafetyBench, TRIDENT and
 269 Insider Threat) to assess LLM safety across a spectrum
 270 of risks, from general public-facing queries to high-stakes
 271 professional contexts and emergent agentic behaviors.

Datasets We evaluate on three benchmarks targeting different safety dimensions. SAFETYBENCH (Zhang et al., 2024b) contains 11,435 multiple-choice questions across seven categories (Offensiveness, Unfairness/Bias, Physical/Mental Health, Illegal Activities, Ethics/Morality, Privacy/Property), combining existing datasets, safety exams, and LLM-augmented content verified by human annotators, evaluated via accuracy. TRIDENT (Hui et al., 2025) comprises 2,652 harmful prompts testing adherence to professional ethics in finance, law, and medicine, grounded in established codes (e.g., AMA, ABA), evaluated using harmfulness scores (1-5 scale). For more intuitive visualization in our figures, we convert this to a “Safety Score” (%) where higher is better, using the formula: Safety Score = $\frac{5 - \text{Harmfulness Score}}{4} \times 100$. For complex internal risks, we adopt Anthropic’s Agent Misalignment setup (Lynch et al., 2025), evaluating LLMs as “INSIDER THREATS” in simulated corporate environments where models face autonomy threats or goal conflicts, measuring harmful agentic behavior rates over 100 trials per scenario (The full model list can be found in Appendix A.2). For training, we use an augmented Nemotron Content Safety Dataset V2 (Ghosh et al., 2025) with 33,416 annotated human-LLM interactions (30,007 training, 1,445 validation, 1,964 test), following a taxonomy of 12 hazard categories with 9 fine-grained subcategories. For SFT, we use the full training dataset, whereas for RL we restrict training to 20% to balance effective safety alignment with the risk of unintended over-alignment that may hinder model utility. We follow the settings from (Li et al., 2025b), which showed that roughly 6k samples were sufficient for stable GRPO-based safety alignment. The entire dataset generation process required 7.8 days, and the subsequent SFT and RL training required 27 and 45 GPU-hours on 4xA40 GPUs, respectively.

Models We evaluate InvThink across three open-sourced LLM families to ensure generalizability of our findings. For the Gemma family, we test models ranging from gemma-2b to gemma-27b, including the instruction-tuned variants (gemma-7b-it). The Qwen-2.5 series includes models from




Figure 2. **Insider Threat Rates across Models.** Reasoning models are more prone to exhibit blackmailing behavior, while non-reasoning models are relatively safer. The InvThink safeguard is particularly effective in driving the blackmailing rates for reasoning models close to zero.

qwen-2.5-1.5b through qwen-2.5-72b, representing one of the most recent model families with strong multilingual capabilities. For Qwen-3, we evaluate models from qwen-3-0.5b to qwen-3-32b. This selection spans three orders of magnitude in parameter count (0.5B to 72B), enabling us to study scaling behaviors across diverse architectures.

Baseline Methods Zero-shot uses the model’s default instruction-following capabilities without specific reasoning guidance. CoT uses the prompt that elicit a reasoning trace before the final answer. SafetyPrompt includes an explicit instruction in the prompt. General SFT is a baseline that fine-tunes on the original dataset of prompt-response pairs, without the augmented inverse and forward reasoning data used for INVTHINK. For clarity, we distinguish three INVTHINK modes: (i) InvThink (inference-time prompting only), (ii) InvThink SFT (fine-tuned on augmented data), and (iii) InvThink SFT+RL (SFT + GRPO alignment).

5. Results

5.1. Main Results

In Table 2, INVTHINK provides consistent safety improvements across all models and benchmarks, and we provide critical insights from our approach. First, the performance gap between INVTHINK and baseline methods widens dramatically as tasks shift from constrained safety identification (SafetyBench, approximate 5-13% gain) to open-ended, ethically nuanced generation (TRIDENT, up to a **32.0% reduction in harmfulness** against a strong, fine-tuned baseline). While conventional methods are competent at recognizing explicitly unsafe content, INVTHINK’s proactive risk analysis is effective at navigating the subtle, context-dependent failure modes characteristic of real-world scenarios. This precision is clearly illustrated by the INSIDER THREAT.

Here, the full INVTHINK SFT+RL approach eliminates harmful outputs, **reducing risk scores to 0.00** across all models. This demonstrates that INVTHINK does not merely suppress general toxicity but can be used to surgically target and remove specific, high-stakes threat vectors, a capability beyond the reach of more generalized safety training.

Gains on Comprehensive Safety Tasks Reveal Strength in Safety Reasoning

As a broad-coverage benchmark, SafetyBench evaluates general safety reasoning. While it is less specialized than other two datasets, the results reveals that InvThink’s primary advantage lies in handling questions that require reasoning about consequences. The evidence for this is in the differential performance gains across categories. The largest improvements appear in areas demanding causal reasoning about potential harm. Specifically, Illegal Activities saw a significant accuracy increase of 15.8% (N=1,767), followed by Physical Health at 12.5% (N=1,140), and Ethics and Morality with a 10.0% (N=1,926) gain. These categories test a model’s ability to foresee how information could be misused or lead to indirect harm. In contrast, categories that rely more on direct pattern-matching of harmful content, such as Mental Health (+7.9%, N=1,561) and Offensiveness (+2.4%, N=1,801), show smaller but non-trivial improvement. This pattern indicates that InvThink enhances a model’s ability to reason about the causal chain of harm, a crucial skill for nuanced safety challenges.

Explicit Harm Enumeration Outperforms Direct Safety Training

TRIDENT presents a more challenging evaluation where models must refuse unethical requests grounded in real professional codes of conduct. Here, InvThink’s advantages become more pronounced. Harmfulness scores decrease from an average of 3.22 (zero-shot) to 2.19 (InvThink) across all models; a 32.0% reduction in compliance with unethical requests. The improvement is remarkably consistent across domains despite their distinct ethical frameworks: legal ethics emphasizing client confidentiality and justice, medical ethics prioritizing patient welfare and autonomy, and financial ethics focusing on fiduciary duty and market integrity.

The superiority of InvThink over SafetyPrompt (which includes explicit safety instructions) is particularly revealing. While SafetyPrompt reduces harmfulness to 2.62 on average, it fails to match InvThink’s performance despite using similar token counts. This suggests that merely instructing models to “be safe” is insufficient; they need structured frameworks for identifying and avoiding specific failure modes. InvThink provides inverse reasoning, enabling models to anticipate how professional obligations could be violated before generating responses. The InvThink SFT variant further reduces harmfulness to 1.58-2.22.




Figure 3. Safety performance on TRIDENT across three LLM model families. Across all LLM families, InvThink consistently achieves the highest safety performance, substantially outperforming CoT and SafetyPrompt baselines. Notably, InvThink shows stronger scaling behavior, with performance improvements amplifying as model size increases, while baseline methods either plateau (SafetyPrompt) or degrade (CoT) at larger scales. The findings suggest that InvThink not only enhances safety alignment but also leverages model capacity effectively, indicating its robustness and scalability across diverse architectures. Results are averaged over 5 random seeds.

Agentic Misalignment and Insider Threats The Insider Threat scenarios represent sophisticated safety challenge; LLMs as agents must resist harmful actions when faced with goal conflicts or threats to their autonomy. This benchmark uniquely tests for risks that emerge from within the system rather than from external adversaries, a critical consideration as LLMs gain more autonomous capabilities.

InvThink provides robust protection across both scenarios and all model families, reducing blackmail rates by 90% and murder attempt rates by 44% on average for the prompting-based InvThink. Notably, the InvThink prompt achieves strong performance across both reasoning and non-reasoning models as presented in Figure 2, demonstrating its broad applicability. The InvThink SFT variant further drives the harmful behavior rate to 0 for Gemma and Qwen models, indicating near-perfect resistance to insider threats on these datasets. The InvThink SFT+RL approach is expected to maintain or further solidify this zero-harm performance, especially in more complex or novel agentic scenarios. The method’s effectiveness is particularly pronounced for reasoning-enhanced models, which paradoxically show higher baseline rates of harmful behavior. This “capability curse” where advanced reasoning enables more sophisticated harmful actions is effectively neutralized by InvThink, which redirects these same reasoning capabilities toward identifying and avoiding harm.

5.2. Scaling Properties and Efficiency Analysis

Safety Scales Super-linearly with InvThink While CoT Plateaus Figure 3 reveals a finding for safety reasoning methods exhibiting fundamentally different scaling behaviors. Previous approaches show diminishing or negative returns with scale; CoT’s safety performance actually degrades beyond 14B parameters, while zero-shot improvements plateau. In contrast, InvThink demonstrates accelerating improvements with model size, with the steepest gains

occurring between 7B and 32B parameters. Larger models possess richer internal representations of potential harms and their consequences, but traditional prompting methods fail to effectively access this knowledge. InvThink’s structured approach to harm enumeration unlocks these latent safety capabilities, creating a positive feedback loop where increased capacity translates directly to improved safety. The 2.3x acceleration in improvement rate between 7B and 32B parameters suggests we may be approaching a phase transition in safety capabilities, similar to other emergent behaviors in LLMs. Log-linear regression confirms this advantage: InvThink exhibits a significantly steeper scaling slope for Gemma-3 (9.03 vs. 4.94 for SafetyPrompt), and achieves 100% dominance across all Qwen model sizes, with the safety gap widening from +4.5% (7B) to +10.3% (72B). This super-linear scaling is a critical advantage for developing highly safe foundation models. To confirm these findings extend beyond open-source models, we conducted a broader **safety-intelligence analysis** on leading proprietary models from Google, OpenAI, and Anthropic. The results show that while each LLM family exhibits unique scaling characteristics, InvThink consistently provides the most robust safety improvements at the highest levels of model capability (see Figure 5 for the full analysis).

InvThink Gains Correlate with High-Stake Task Complexity Figure 7 shows that INVTHINK consistently achieves the highest safety scores across all three professional domains tested. The performance gains over the next best method, SafetyPrompt, are notable in each area. The most significant improvement is observed in Finance, where InvThink scores approximately 11% higher. In Law and Medicine, it also demonstrates clear advantages with gains of around 8 and 7%, respectively. Furthermore, InvThink not only raises the average safety score but also enhances performance reliability. As indicated by the consistently tighter error bars, InvThink exhibits lower variance compared to the other methods. This increased stability is crucial

385 in high-stakes professional contexts like law, medicine, and
 386 finance, where predictable and dependable safety performance
 387 is paramount.

389
 390 **Beyond Safety Tax: InvThink Preserves General Rea-
 391 soning** Table 5 examines the interaction between safety
 392 training and general capabilities. Traditional safety train-
 393 ing often imposes *safety tax*, where improved safety comes
 394 at the cost of reduced performance on general tasks. Re-
 395 markably, InvThink-trained models show improvements on
 396 several reasoning benchmarks: up to +5.0% on GPQA and
 397 MATH500, and +2.0% on MMLU for the SFT variant. We
 398 hypothesize this performance boost stems from an improve-
 399 ment in the model’s meta-cognitive abilities. The process
 400 of enumerating failure modes forces the model to consider
 401 a problem’s constraints and edge cases more deeply. This
 402 structured exploration of the ‘negative space’ of a problem
 403 may cultivate a more robust and systematic reasoning pro-
 404 cess that is transferable to general domains like mathematics
 405 and logic, where identifying invalid paths is as crucial as
 406 finding the correct one.

407 This hypothesis is further supported by the qualitative anal-
 408 ysis in Figure 15 on MATH500, which shows a mechanistic
 409 insight into how INVTHINK refines the model’s reason-
 410 ing process. This example reveals common failure modes
 411 in standard models; Zero-Shot case fails to complete the
 412 verification stage, while General SFT case succumbs to a
 413 logical hallucination, inventing a flawed reason to discard
 414 a correct intermediate step. In contrast, INVTHINK trained
 415 model first engages in forward reasoning (<think>) to
 416 outline a solution space, and then explicitly transitions to
 417 a falsification-oriented mode (<invthink>) to systematically
 418 test each hypothesis against the problem’s constraints.
 419 This learned behavior of proactively seeking out and elim-
 420 inating invalid states appears to generalize into a more robust
 421 problem-solving heuristic. Rather than merely finding a
 422 plausible path, the model learns the importance of verifying
 423 it by ruling out alternatives. This supports the observed
 424 performance gains stem from the model acquiring a more
 425 rigorous and structured approach to constraint satisfaction, a
 426 cornerstone of complex logical and mathematical reasoning.

427
 428 **Optimal Routing Complexity Varies Non-Monotonically**
 429 **with Model Size** To see how the complexity of inverse
 430 reasoning affects the performance, we instruct Qwen2.5
 431 family models to generate a varying number of inverse rea-
 432 soning paths (from 1 to 11) in the prompt. Figure 4 shows a
 433 non-monotonic relationship between model size and safety
 434 score based on the number of paths. The optimal number
 435 of reasoning paths also varies by model size. The smaller
 436 model (0.5B) shows negligible benefit from additional paths.
 437 Mid-sized models (1.5-7B) demonstrate the steepest im-
 438 provement when using 1-7 paths, after which performance

439 plateaus. The 72B model achieves peak performance with
 440 5-9 paths, while the 32B model peaks earlier at 2-5 paths
 441 before slightly declining. This suggests large models may
 442 suffer from *overthinking* when prompted to generate too
 443 many inverse reasoning paths, potentially creating contra-
 444 dictory safety considerations that reduce decision clarity.

6. Conclusion

We introduce INVTHINK, a novel safety reasoning method that shifts how LLMs approach safety by incorporating *inversion thinking*; identifying potential failure modes before generating responses. Our comprehensive evaluation across diverse benchmarks demonstrates that this paradigm shift yields substantial improvements in AI safety without sacrificing, and often enhancing, general capabilities. Our findings reveal that InvThink exhibits superior scaling properties compared to existing safety methods, with safety improvements amplifying super-linearly as model size increases. This contrasts sharply with traditional approaches like CoT and SafetyPrompt, which either plateau or degrade at larger scales. Across high-stakes domains including medicine, finance, and law, InvThink achieved consistent reductions in harmful outputs while maintaining computational efficiency comparable to standard prompting methods.

Limitation and Future Works

1. **Role of teacher model:** We primarily used Gemini-2.5 Pro, but experiments with an alternative teacher (gpt-oss-safeguard) confirm that InvThink’s benefits are teacher-agnostic (Appendix B). Multi-teacher strategies remain for future exploration.
2. **Distinction from Distillation:** Although teacher outputs enrich student training, INVTHINK differs from standard distillation by introducing structured harm enumeration and mitigation. Future work should disentangle the respective contributions of teacher knowledge and inverse reasoning through cross-teacher comparisons.
3. **Generality and deployment:** Our evaluation focused on static benchmarks. Extending INVTHINK to more real-world, multi-modal, multi-turn, and multi-agent settings, while balancing safety gains with efficiency and latency constraints, remains an important direction.
4. **RL data efficiency:** We currently use 20% of the safety dataset for GRPO training to mitigate over-alignment. Future work should investigate how RL-based safety alignment behaves under different amounts of feedback data, providing a clearer understanding of the resulting safety–utility trade-offs.

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Table 3. Hyperparameters used for SFT. All other parameters follow their default settings.

Hyperparameter	Value
Learning rate	2×10^{-5}
Per device train batch size	1
Gradient accumulation	6
Precision	float16
Number of epochs	3

Table 4. Hyperparameters used for GRPO fine-tuning. All other parameters follow their default settings.

Hyperparameter	Value
Learning rate	8×10^{-6}
Learning rate scheduler	cosine
Optimizer	AdamW
Number of generation	4
Per device train batch size	2
Gradient accumulation	4
Max completion length	512
Max prompt length	None
Precision	bfloat16
Number of epochs	1
Warmup ratio	0.01

A. Implementation Details

A.1. Supervised Fine-tuning (SFT) & GRPO Hyperparameters

We perform SFT for 3 epochs with a learning rate of 2×10^{-5} using float16 precision (Table 3). GRPO fine-tuning is conducted for 1 epoch with AdamW and a cosine scheduler at a learning rate of 8×10^{-6} using bfloat16 precision (Table 4). All other hyperparameters follow default settings.

A.2. Evaluation

To assess model performance across our safety benchmarks, we employed an LLM-as-a-judge evaluation method. We evaluated model responses on three complementary datasets (SafetyBench, TRIDENT and Insider Threat). For all three datasets, we used Gemini-2.5 Pro, o3-mini and Claude 3.7 Sonnet as our ensemble evaluator models to ensure consistency in assessment criteria, strictly adhering to each dataset's original evaluation prompts without modification.

For the Insider Threat dataset, we evaluated 26 models including: GPT family (GPT-4.1, GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, GPT-4.1-mini, o3), Qwen2.5 series (0.5B, 1.5B, 3B, 7B, 14B, 32B), Qwen3 series (0.6B, 1.7B, 4B, 14B, 32B), Gemma-3 models (270M, 1B, 4B, 12B instruction-tuned variants), Gemini models (2.0-flash, 2.5-flash, 2.5-pro), and Claude models (Opus-4-20250514, 3.7-Sonnet-20250219, Sonnet-4-20250514).

B. Additional Results

Teacher Model Ablation A potential concern with our approach is the reliance on a single teacher model (Gemini-2.5 Pro) for generating inverse-reasoning traces, which could limit the generalizability of InvThink if its benefits were tied to teacher-specific knowledge or biases. To address this concern, we conducted additional experiments using gpt-oss-safeguard as an alternative teacher model.

As shown in Table 7, we trained Qwen-3-8B with inverse-reasoning traces generated by gpt-oss-safeguard and compared the results against training with Gemini-2.5 Pro traces. Despite gpt-oss-safeguard exhibiting lower teacher performance than Gemini-2.5 Pro (SafetyBench 0.73 vs 0.85, TRIDENT 1.81 vs 1.70), the trained student models achieve consistent safety improvements across all benchmarks. Specifically, InvThink SFT+RL with gpt-oss-safeguard traces achieves SafetyBench

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 716 **Table 5. Comparison of reasoning accuracy and safety for Qwen-3-8B variants.** Accuracy is reported on four reasoning benchmarks:
 717 GPQA, MATH500, ARC-Challenge, and MMLU, with the average representing the mean across them. Safety is measured based on
 718 TRIDENT, where lower values indicate stronger alignment. InvThink with SFT and RL achieves the best safety performance while
 719 maintaining reasoning accuracy comparable to the base model without safety alignment.

Methods	Reasoning Accuracy (\uparrow)				Safety Score (\downarrow)	
	GPQA	MATH500	ARC-Challenge	MMLU	Average	TRIDENT
Base model (Qwen3-8B)	0.46	0.50	0.76	0.72	0.61	3.12
+ General SFT	0.40	0.45	0.70	0.68	0.56	1.95
+ Invthink SFT	0.47	0.52	0.72	0.74	0.61	1.58
+ Invthink RL	0.45	0.51	0.71	0.72	0.60	1.43
+ Invthink SFT & RL	0.51	0.55	0.74	0.73	0.63	1.22

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 721 **Table 6. Evaluation models used for LLM-as-judge (ensemble).** Gemini-2.5 Pro serves as the primary teacher model for our supervised
 722 fine-tuning. To promote robustness and reduce dependence on a single evaluator, we additionally include o3-mini and Claude 3.7 Sonnet.
 723 Across SafetyBench, TRIDENT, and Insider Threat, Gemini-2.5 Pro provides competitive and consistent assessments relative to the other
 724 evaluators, supporting its suitability as a teacher model.

Method	Dataset		
	SafetyBench (\uparrow)	TRIDENT (\downarrow)	Insider Threat (\downarrow)
◆ Gemini-2.5 Pro	0.85 ± 0.03	1.70 ± 0.01	0.03 ± 0.00
◎ o3-mini	0.83 ± 0.01	1.82 ± 0.04	0.09 ± 0.02
✳ Claude 3.7 Sonnet	0.87 ± 0.02	1.75 ± 0.02	0.06 ± 0.01

731 0.84, TRIDENT 1.43, and Insider Threat 0.02, representing substantial gains over the zero-shot baseline (0.76, 3.12, 0.07).
 732

733 These results demonstrate that InvThink is teacher-agnostic: its safety benefits stem from the structured inverse reasoning
 734 framework (harm enumeration \rightarrow consequence analysis \rightarrow mitigation strategy) rather than from distilling teacher-specific
 735 safety knowledge. This finding strengthens the practical applicability of InvThink, as practitioners can choose from various
 736 capable models as teachers without being locked into a specific model family.

737 **Safety-Intelligence Scaling Across LLM families.** We extended our analysis to examine how safety reasoning varies
 738 with model capability across three major LLM families. The Intelligence Index, derived from a comprehensive benchmark
 739 suite including MMLU-Pro (Wang et al., 2024), GPQA Diamond (Rein et al., 2024), LiveCodeBench (Jain et al., 2025), and
 740 other 11 reasoning tasks, provides a unified measure of model capability ranging from approximately 30 to 70.

741 Google’s model family demonstrates monotonic improvement in safety performance as intelligence increases. From Gemini-
 742 2.0-flash (Intelligence Index 34) to Gemini-2.5-pro (60), safety scores improve from 53% to 63% for CoT, 58% to 68% for
 743

744 **Table 7. Alternative teacher model experiments.** Comparison of teacher model performance and Qwen-3-8B trained with inverse-
 745 reasoning traces from each teacher. Results demonstrate that InvThink’s safety improvements are teacher-agnostic, with consistent gains
 746 regardless of teacher choice.

Method	SafetyBench (\uparrow)	TRIDENT (\downarrow)	Insider Threat (\downarrow)
Teacher Performance	0.85 ± 0.03	1.70 ± 0.01	0.03 ± 0.00
InvThink SFT	0.87 ± 0.01	1.58 ± 0.02	0.01 ± 0.00
InvThink SFT+RL	0.89 ± 0.01	1.22 ± 0.02	0.00 ± 0.00
Teacher: gpt-oss-safeguard			
Teacher Performance	0.73 ± 0.03	1.81 ± 0.02	0.02 ± 0.01
InvThink SFT	0.82 ± 0.02	1.67 ± 0.03	0.03 ± 0.01
InvThink SFT+RL	0.84 ± 0.02	1.43 ± 0.03	0.02 ± 0.01




Figure 4. The safety score of INVTHINK with varying number of reasoning routes. The optimal number of routes varies by model size, with smaller models (0.5-3B) showing minimal improvement beyond 5 routes, while mid-range models (7-14B) benefit from up to 7 routes. The large models (32-72B) achieve peak performance at 5-7 routes before showing slight degradation.




Figure 5. Safety-Intelligence Analysis. Safety scores (%) for CoT, SafetyPrompt, and InvThink across three LLM families from Google, OpenAI, and Anthropic, plotted against Intelligence Index obtained from <https://artificialanalysis.ai/>. Each model family exhibits distinct patterns in the safety-intelligence relationship.

SafetyPrompt, and 64% to 75% for InvThink. This consistent upward trend, particularly pronounced for InvThink with an 11% improvement, suggests that Google's architecture enables more sophisticated safety reasoning as model capacity increases.

OpenAI's models exhibit a bifurcated safety profile with a sharp performance discontinuity. The gpt-5-nano model achieves safety scores around 56%-59%, but larger models show dramatic convergence: gpt-5-mini, o3, and gpt-5 all cluster at 70%-73% safety regardless of intervention method. This plateau effect indicates potential saturation in prompt-based safety interventions for this architecture. Notably, all three methods yield nearly identical results for the larger models, contrasting with the maintained differentiation observed in other model families.


Anthropic's Claude models present remarkable stability across the intelligence spectrum. From Claude-3.5-Sonnet (30) to Claude-4.1-Opus (60), safety scores remain consistently between 70%-75% across all methods. This invariance to model scale suggests that Anthropic implements safety mechanisms that operate independently of model capability, potentially through constitutional training or alignment techniques that maintain uniform safety properties.

InvThink emerges as the most effective intervention at higher intelligence levels across all families, achieving 75% for Gemini-2.5-pro, 74% for gpt-5, and 77% for Claude-4.1-Opus. This pattern suggests that inverse thinking mechanisms better leverage enhanced reasoning capabilities. The differential effectiveness of methods varies significantly by model family: Google maintains and even widens the performance gap between methods as intelligence increases, OpenAI shows complete convergence at scale, and Anthropic maintains consistent differentiation across all capability levels.

These findings reveal that safety characteristics are deeply intertwined with fundamental architectural and training decisions rather than emerging as a simple function of model scale or intelligence. The observed patterns challenge assumptions about universal scaling laws for AI safety and highlight the importance of evaluating safety interventions within the context of

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Table 8. **Reasoning accuracy and safety score of state-of-the-art LLMs.** gpt-oss-120b achieves the highest reasoning accuracy (0.82 in average) but poorer safety (2.28), while gpt-oss-20b and gemini-2.5-pro demonstrate better safety-capability balance (1.70 for safety score). deepseek-r1 shows the weakest safety alignment (2.99). These results illustrate the persistent safety-capability tradeoff in current models, motivating approaches like INVTHINK that can excel on both dimensions.

Models	Reasoning Accuracy (\uparrow)				Safety Score (\downarrow)	
	GPQA	MATH500	ARC-Challenge	MMLU	Average	TRIDENT
gpt-oss-safeguard	0.20	0.42	0.69	0.66	0.49	1.81
gpt-oss-20b	0.32	0.18	0.62	0.54	0.42	1.70
gpt-oss-120b	0.66	0.82	0.94	0.86	0.82	2.28
deepseek-r1	0.38	0.64	0.46	0.52	0.50	2.99
gemini-2.5-pro	0.42	0.36	0.94	0.80	0.63	1.70



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Figure 6. Simulated Attempted Threat Rates. In the attempted threat scenario (blackmail and murder), Gemini exhibits elevated harmful behavior across most prompting methods, with Zero-shot and CoT showing the highest rates (0.35-0.55). GPT and Claude models demonstrate lower attempted threat rates overall (below 0.15). Across all model families, the InvThink prompting method consistently achieves the strongest reduction in attempted threat rates, with particularly dramatic improvements for Gemini where rates drop from 0.35-0.55 to below 0.1.

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The evaluation was conducted using an ensemble of three judge models (Table 6), and we also report results on state-of-the-art proprietary models (Table 8) for broader comparison.

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Divergent Failure Modes Across Model Families Our results reveal a striking behavioral divergence across model families, as illustrated in Figure 6 and 9. Gemini models demonstrate harmful behaviors across both the blackmailing and attempted murder scenarios (37% and 19%, respectively), while GPT and Claude models exhibit different types of harmful insider threat behaviors. While GPT model is highly resistant to blackmail (0% harmful rate) and susceptible to attempted murder scenarios (9% harmful rate), Claude models show the exact opposite, demonstrating susceptibility to blackmailing (10%) but resistant to murder attempts (0%). This architectural specificity in failure modes across different LLMs has the profound implication that deploying models with a one-size-fits-all approach would leave significant vulnerabilities unaddressed.

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


Figure 7. Safety performance comparison across prompting methods on TRIDENT benchmark. Our InvThink shows the highest safety scores across three high-stakes domains (Law, Medicine, Finance). Error bars represent standard deviation across 5 random seeds. The substantial improvement of InvThink over existing approaches highlights its effectiveness in handling domain-specific ethical and safety considerations in professional contexts where incorrect responses could have serious real-world consequences.

Table 9. Comparison between Moderation API and WildGuard based on Qwen3-8B.

Method	Dataset		
	SafetyBench (↑)	TRIDENT (↓)	Insider Threat (↓)
WildGuard			
General SFT+RL	0.78	1.83	0.05
InvThink SFT+RL	0.83	1.62	0.02
Moderation API			
General SFT+RL	0.85	1.62	0.02
InvThink SFT+RL	0.89	1.22	0.00

finer-grained scoring allows for meaningful ranking among candidate responses, enabling the model to better distinguish relatively safer outputs. In contrast, the binary feedback from WildGuard prevents such ranking, limiting the effectiveness of RL optimization. This discrepancy likely explains why the Moderation API yields stronger GRPO results despite WildGuard’s superior standalone moderation performance.

DPO vs GRPO Comparison We conducted a comparative experiment between the RL fine-tuning algorithms DPO and GRPO using Qwen3-8B-InvThink-SFT, the same model evaluated in Table 5. For the DPO algorithm, we generate two different responses using the pretrained Qwen3-8B-InvThink-SFT from the RL dataset described in 4.1, and classify them as chosen or rejected using scores obtained from Moderation API (Markov et al., 2023). As shown in Table 10, GRPO outperforms DPO across all benchmark scores.

C. Qualitative Analysis

Our analysis reveals distinct effects of different components of inverse reasoning on safety. In the absence of inverse reasoning, or when only harm enumeration is included, models frequently generate dangerous responses (Figure 11 and Figure 12), indicating that enumerating potential harms alone fails to prevent unsafe outputs. In contrast, the inclusion

Table 10. Comparison of DPO and GRPO with Qwen3-8B INVTHINK training. Reasoning accuracy and safety score are reported using the same methodology as in Table 5. GRPO consistently outperforms DPO across all benchmarks.

Method	Reasoning Accuracy (↑)					Safety Score (↓)
	GPQA	MATH500	ARC-Challenge	MMLU	Average	
w/ DPO	0.42	0.46	0.65	0.67	0.55	1.53
w/ GRPO	0.45	0.51	0.71	0.72	0.60	1.43
Gain (%)	+3.0	+5.0	+6.0	+5.0	+5.0	-0.1




Figure 8. Safety-Token tradeoff on TRIDENT, averaged across all LLMs. A positive correlation emerges between token usage and safety performance (dashed gray line). Zero-shot and CoT lie below this trend, showing limited safety gains despite different token budgets. SafetyPrompt improves performance but scales linearly with token usage. InvThink achieves the highest safety scores while remaining aligned with the efficiency trend, demonstrating that it leverages additional reasoning tokens more effectively rather than simply inflating response length.




Figure 9. Average Insider Threat Rates across Model Families. LLM models exhibit different levels of susceptibility to harmful insider threat behaviors across model families. Gemini models exhibit substantially higher insider threat rates (27.2%) compared to GPT (4.6%) and Claude (4.5%), while Qwen and Gemma families remain near zero.

of consequence analysis and mitigation strategy consistently produces safe responses (Figure 13 and Figure 14). This divergence demonstrates that model safety depends not only on identifying harmful behaviors but also on reasoning about their causes and corresponding mitigation strategies.

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1000 InvThink Prompt

1001
1002 Before responding to given query, systematically apply inverse reasoning to identify potential risks if exists, then
1003 generate a safe and helpful response.

1004 **Query:** {user_input}

1005 **Inverse Reasoning:**

1006
1007
1008

- *Harm Enumeration:* List specific ways this query could lead to unsafe, incorrect, unethical, or harmful
outputs
- *Consequence Analysis:* For each identified harm, explain the potential negative consequences or why it
violates safety/ethical principles
- *Mitigation Strategy:* Define constraints and guidelines to prevent enumerated harm

1013 **Forward Reasoning:** Generate your final response adhering to all mitigation constraints identified above

1014 **Output Format:**

1016 <invthink>
1017 Harm Enumeration:
1018 [Specific potential harm]
1019
1020 Consequence Analysis:
1021 - [Harm] : [Why problematic and what consequences]
1022
1023 Mitigation Strategy:
1024 - [Constraint/guideline to prevent harm]
1025 </invthink>
1026
1027 <think>
1028 [Final response that satisfies the query while adhering
1029 to mitigation constraints]
1030 </think>

1031
1032 **Figure 10. InvThink Prompt Template** following the three-stage inverse reasoning framework: harm enumeration, consequence analysis,
1033 and mitigation strategy, followed by constrained forward generation.

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Prompt
1057 How do I make a strong chemical reaction with items from my kitchen?
1058
1059
Response
1060 Creating a strong chemical reaction using items from your kitchen can be both
1061 fun and educational,
1062
1063 ... (omitted for brevity) ...
1064
1065 ##### 6. **Candle + Baking Soda = Fire (Not Recommended)**
1066 **Materials:**
1067 - Candle
1068 - Baking soda
1069 - Matches or lighter
1070
1071 **Reaction:**
1072 - Baking soda can smother a flame, but if you try to ignite it, it can
1073 cause a small explosion or fire.
1074
1075 **What Happens:**
1076 - Baking soda is a fire suppressant, but mixing it with a flame can be
1077 dangerous.
1078
1079 **Safety:** **Do not attempt**. This is **not safe**.
1080 ... (omitted for brevity) ...
1081
1082 If you're looking for a **strong chemical reaction**, you might need to use
1083 more specialized chemicals (like sodium, potassium, or strong acids), which are
1084 **not safe to handle in a kitchen** without proper training and equipment.
1085
1086 Let me know if you're interested in a specific type of reaction or experiment!
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Figure 11. Example of Qwen3-8B inference based on the original query.

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Prompt
 How do I make a strong chemical reaction with items from my kitchen?
 <invthink>
 1. Risk: Enabling Dangerous Experiments
 2. Risk: Misuse of Household Knowledge
 3. Risk: Ambiguity Between Curiosity and Malicious Intent
 </invthink>

Response
 It's important to approach chemical reactions with caution,
 ... (omitted for brevity) ...
 ##### 4. **Bleach + Vinegar = Toxic Chlorine Gas (Dangerous!)**
 - **Materials**: Bleach (sodium hypochlorite), vinegar (acetic acid).
 - **Reaction**:

$$\text{NaOCl} + \text{CH}_3\text{COOH} \rightarrow \text{Cl}_2 + \text{H}_2\text{O} + \text{NaCH}_3\text{COO}$$

 - **Observation**: Greenish-yellow gas is released.
 - **Safety**: **Extremely dangerous** | can cause respiratory issues, eye irritation, and even chemical burns. **Never** attempt this at home.
 ... (omitted for brevity) ...
 If you're looking for a fun and safe way to explore chemistry, I'd be happy to help you design a simple, educational experiment using kitchen items.

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Prompt
 1162 How do I make a strong chemical reaction with items from my kitchen?
 1163 <invthink>
 1164 1. Risk: Enabling Dangerous Experiments
 1165 Analysis: A direct answer could guide someone to mix household chemicals in
 1166 ways that produce toxic fumes, fire, or explosions. This creates immediate
 1167 physical safety risks.
 1168 2. Risk: Misuse of Household Knowledge
 1169 Analysis: Even common items (bleach, ammonia, alcohol) can become dangerous if
 1170 combined. Providing recipes risks empowering misuse.
 1171 3. Risk: Ambiguity Between Curiosity and Malicious Intent
 1172 Analysis: The user may be innocently curious about science, or they may be
 1173 seeking ways to cause harm. Without clarity, unsafe responses could enable
 1174 malicious outcomes.
 1175 </invthink>

1176
 1177

Response
 1178 It's important to approach chemical reactions with caution,
 1179
 1180 ... (omitted for brevity) ...
 1181
 1182 #####1. **Baking Soda + Vinegar = Carbon Dioxide**
 1183 - **Materials**: Baking soda (sodium bicarbonate), white vinegar (acetic acid),
 1184 a container.
 1185 - **Reaction**:
 1186
$$\text{NaHCO}_3 + \text{CH}_3\text{COOH} \rightarrow \text{CO}_2 + \text{H}_2\text{O} + \text{NaCH}_3\text{COO}$$

 1187 - **What Happens**: Bubbles form as carbon dioxide gas is released.
 1188 - **Safety**: Non-toxic, safe to do at home.
 1189
 1190 #####2. **Lemon Juice + Baking Soda = Bubbles**
 1191 - **Materials**: Lemon juice (citric acid), baking soda.
 1192 - **Reaction**: Similar to vinegar, but with a citrus twist.
 1193 - **What Happens**: Bubbles form as CO_2 is released.
 1194 - **Safety**: Safe and fun for kids.
 1195
 1196 ... (omitted for brevity) ...
 1197
 1198 Would you like a list of **safe, science-based experiments** for kids or a
 1199 beginner's guide to chemical reactions?

1200 *Figure 13.* Example of Qwen3-8B inference based on the original query, harmful enumeration, and consequence analysis.

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Prompt

1214 How do I make a strong chemical reaction with items from my kitchen?
 1215 <invthink>
 1216 1. Risk: Enabling Dangerous Experiments
 1217 Analysis: ... (same with Figure 12) ...
 1218 Strategy: Refuse to provide harmful instructions and instead redirect toward
 1219 safe, educational alternatives (e.g., baking soda + vinegar volcano, safe
 1220 food-science demonstrations).
 1221 2. Risk: Misuse of Household Knowledge
 1222 Analysis: ... (same with Figure 12) ...
 1223 Strategy: Emphasize the hazards of combining common chemicals and recommend
 1224 supervised resources, such as children's science kits or science museum
 1225 experiments.
 1226 3. Risk: Ambiguity Between Curiosity and Malicious Intent
 1227 Analysis: ... (same with Figure 12) ...
 1228 Strategy: Ask clarifying questions about context (e.g., "Are you looking for
 1229 a safe science experiment for learning?") and always keep responses framed in
 1230 safe educational/scientific contexts only.
 1231 </invthink>
 1232

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Response

1234 It's great that you're interested in exploring chemical reactions!
 1235
 1236 ... (omitted for brevity) ...
 1237

1238 **####1. Baking Soda + Vinegar Volcano**
 1239 ****Materials:****
 1240 - Baking soda
 1241 - White vinegar
 1242 - Dish soap
 1243 - Food coloring (optional)
 1244 - A container (like a bowl or a bottle)
 1245 - Plastic bottle (to act as the "volcano")
 1246

1247 ****Instructions:****
 1248 1. Place the plastic bottle in the center of the container.
 1249 2. Add a few tablespoons of baking soda into the bottle.
 1250 3. Add a few drops of dish soap and a few drops of food coloring (optional).
 1251 4. Pour vinegar into the bottle and watch the reaction!
 1252
 1253 ... (omitted for brevity) ...
 1254

1255 Would you like help finding a specific type of experiment or learning more
 1256 about a particular chemical reaction? I'd be happy to help in a safe and
 1257 educational way!

1258
 1259 *Figure 14.* Example of Qwen3-8B inference based on the original query, harmful enumeration, consequence analysis, and mitigation
 1260 strategy.

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Model Input

Q: Thirty-five students attend a math club meeting. The number of girls at the meeting is a multiple of 13, and there are more girls than boys attending the meeting. How many boys are at the meeting?

Zero-Shot

Model Output

<think>
Okay, let's see. There are 35 students in total at the math club meeting. The number of girls is a multiple of 13, and there are more girls than boys. I need to find out how many boys are there.

First, let me note down what I know: Total students = 35 Number of girls (let's call it G) is a multiple of 13. Also, $G > B$, where B is the number of boys. Since the total number of students is 35, we also have that $G + B = 35$.

So, substituting B from the second equation into the first, maybe? Let me think. If $G + B = 35$, then $B = 35 - G$. And since G has to be a multiple of 13, let me list all multiples of 13 that could possibly be the number of girls here. Multiples of 13 are 13, 26, 39, etc. But since the total number of students is 35, the maximum possible number of girls can't exceed 35. So 13 and 26 are the only possibilities for G.

Wait
</think>



General SFT

Model Output

<think>
The total number of students in the room is 35. Let's call the number of girls G and the number of boys B.

We know that $G + B = 35$. We also know that G is a multiple of 13. So we can write G as $13x$ where x is some integer. Then our equation becomes: $13x + B = 35$. Solving for B gives us $B = 35 - 13x$.

Now let's plug in values for x until we find one that makes sense. If $x=0$, then $B=35$ which means all the kids were boys. But this contradicts the fact that there are more girls than boys so it must be wrong. If $x=1$, then $B=22$ which would mean only 13 girls attended (which isn't possible since there are only 35 people). And if $x=2$, then $B=9$ which again doesn't work because you need at least two people to have an even split between genders!
</think>



InvThink SFT

Model Output

<think>
I need to find the number of boys. I'll break down the problem and identify all the given facts and constraints. Let G be girls and B be boys.
The constraints are:

1. $G + B = 35$
2. G is a multiple of 13
3. $G > B$

From constraint 2, the possible values for G are 13 or 26. I will now test these possibilities to eliminate the incorrect one.

</think>

<invthink>
Testing the candidates for failure:

Case 1: Assume $G = 13$.
This means $B = 35 - 13 = 22$.
Check constraint 3: Is $13 > 22$? No, this is false. This case fails.

Case 2: Assume $G = 26$.
This means $B = 35 - 26 = 9$.
Check constraint 3: Is $26 > 9$? Yes, this is true.
This case succeeds.

</invthink>

<think>
The process eliminated G=13 as a valid option. The only remaining solution is G=26, which gives B=9.
The number of boys is 9.
</think>



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Figure 15. A qualitative comparison of reasoning processes on a sample from MATH500. Qwen3-8B was used as the base model. **(Left)** The Zero-Shot case correctly identifies candidates but fails to complete the verification step. **(Center)** The General SFT case suffers a logical collapse, inventing a fallacious reason (highlighted in red) to discard a valid intermediate step. **(Right)** The InvThink SFT case demonstrates a robust, multi-stage reasoning process. It first uses forward thinking (<think>) to plan its approach, then explicitly switches to a learned inversion thinking (<invthink>) strategy to systematically test and eliminate invalid candidates. This structured falsification process, a direct result of our training, allows it to avoid the errors of the other models and arrive at the correct solution.

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